TIM ROBINSON FRAeS offers initial thoughts and analysis on the air power aspect of the conflict in Ukraine.
As this is written, Ukraine is in the fight of its life (its 'Battle of Britain' as one commentator noted) after Russian forces invaded on 24 February. As might be expected, details are sketchy, information is unverified and there is natural tendency for each side to play up successes and downplay setbacks. Despite the granularity of social media videos and photos, which is now backed by open-source intelligence able to geolocate photos from the tiniest details, the 'big picture' is somewhat missing – especially from the Russian side and the actual aims of its campaign.
However, we can put together some initial analysis based on observations so far. Firstly is that the Russian invasion has not gone to plan – with one report suggesting the aim was to capture Kyiv and major cities in 48hrs. Some experts predicted that Russia, with investment in cruise missiles, EW, PGMs, hypersonics and stealth fighters would start with a Gulf War-style 'Desert Storm' overwhelming air campaign to destroy the Ukrainian air force on the ground, hit air defence and command centres, before committing its ground forces. Instead, Moscow's generals appear to have neglected logistics and attempted to initially perform 2003 Iraqi Freedom-style 'Thunder Runs' to seize major objectives, without having first achieving air superiority. This has been a very costly mistake.
An airport too far

Su34 fighter-bomber takes off from Belarus prior to the invasion. (Russian MoD)
While cruise, ballistic missile and tactical air strikes opened the campaign, the first sign of the Russian plan unraveling was a daring helicopter-borne assault on Hostomel airport outside Kyiv, the home of Antonov Aircraft and the giant An225 transporter. In this some 6-7 helicopters were reportedly shot down in an opposed landing, along with two of the latest Ka-52 attack helicopters. The VDV forces involved in this aerial bridgehead were then repulsed, reportingly causing 18- Il-76s with the main force to abort their flight and turn back to base. Despite this setback, however, the Russians attempted another air assault and this time it reportedly lost two Il-76s in the process – one allegedly shot down by an Ukrainian Su-27 fighter. If this is true and both these aircraft were full of paratroopers, that could mean that almost 300 elite troops may have died in these shootdowns – an high-price that illustrates the danger of operating military transporters in contested airspace. An influx of Stinger MANPADS from NATO nations will also make life even more dangerous for Russian helicopter and aircraft crews.
Despite its massive superiority in combat aircraft (some 300+ combat aircraft vs Ukraine's less than 100) Russia's air force has been conspicuously absent in the air war - a fact noted by several defence experts and analysts. Only now are larger strike packages of Su-30 and Su-34s being assembled. This is a far cry from the US/Western air power doctrine, which stress large packages of strike, SEAD and escorts to overwhelm the enemy on Day 1 of any air campaign.
There has also been little evidence of Russian UAV activity, despite the the Army's extensive use of multiple tactical UAVs to cue in massed artillery strikes in Eastern Ukraine since 2014.
Who's afraid of the big bad S400?

Threat rings of Russian S400 and other SAMs visualised in Command Modern Operations.
Another observation is that the SA-21/S400 SAM, the 'big bad' of NATO planners and a key selling point of the F-35 (buy stealth if you want to fly in airspace where triple digit SAMs are active) has so far failed to clear the skies of the Ukrainian air force – which has amazingly has remained operational for longer than expected. This may be down the fact of simple physics, that a SAM systems effective range is still dictated by the radar horizon while UkrAF tactics in flying low and keeping in the ground clutter may have also helped. Videos of Ukrainian fighters have seen much low-level footage, which has potentially helped establish the 'Ghost of Kyiv' jet ace legend. Russian SAM operators too, may be reluctant to fire into a zone where the majority of their aircraft are operating and where both sides operate similar types. In Georgia in 2008, for example, some three or four Russian aircraft were downed by their own side. As Peter Hoare, from the Royal Aeronautical Society's Air & Space Power Group observes: "Air defence integration has always been Russia’s Achille’s Heel. Remember how easy it was for Western forces to penetrate Syrian air defences (guaranteed by Russia) to strike chemical weapons facilities."
Additionally, before the crisis, the Ukrainian AF was observed training in dispersed operations from road bases. This, and the difficulty of shutting down airbases completely (NATO planners in the Cold War expected to have to fly repeated strikes against Warsaw Pact bases in East German) has potentially assisted the UkrAF to remain operational against a much larger opponent longer than many analysts expected.
Though total losses of the Ukrainian AF are unknown, recent footage of Turkish-built Ukrainian TB2 drones destroying at least two Buk SAMs and convoys shows that armed UAVs are still active and taking a toll of Russian ground forces. At least one SA-22 short range air defence vehicle was also spotted abandoned in deep mud in Kherson in the south, highlighting some of the logistic challenges.
A low-observable no-fly zone?

Could UN-backed stealth fighters impose a NFZ on both sides? (RNLAF)
There have also been some calls for NATO or the UN to establish a no-fly zone (NFZ), to protect civilians on the ground from the worst of air strikes. This would however, bring NATO pilots into direct conflict with Russian ones, and potentially escalate this into a far wider war having crossed President Putin's 'red line' of direct involvement in this conflict. The fear is to enforce any NFZ, NATO combat aircraft would have to inevitably attack Russian long-range S400M sites in Russia or face being shot down from afar.
However, President of the UK's Air & Space Power Association, former senior RAF commander, Air Marshal Greg Bagwell suggested on social media that a NFZ could work – if it was a UN-mandated NFZ, if the risk of escalation was managed (with Western pilots 'turning the other cheek' if targeted by SAMs from outside Ukraine) and potentially if F-22/F-35s were used. Using stealth fighters that could ignore S400M threat then, but engage any airborne aircraft or helicopter (including Ukrainian AF ones) or active air defence units within Ukraine's own border then, could be a way in which the international community could intervene to protect civilian lives. As Bagwell notes: "would the potential benefits of an International NFZ working outweigh the desire for Ukraine to maintain any indigenous air capability?"
But RAeS Air & Space Power Group expert, Peter Hoare, though, warns that despite the Western desire to 'do something' and intervene: "Putin’s veiled threat of nuclear escalation makes this [NFZ] a non-starter."
Meanwhile on 1 March, UK PM Boris Johnson told media that a NFZ was "simply not on the agenda of any NATO country" because of the risks of escalation with Russia. "That's a very, very big step."
While a NFZ now seems less likely, it is reasonable to assume that having openly supplied weapons and equipment to the Ukraine government, Kyiv is also benefiting from the Wests impressive ISR capability, with satellite, airborne and electric intelligence being passed their way. ISR flights by NATO nations before the conflict while have undoubtedly assisted in building up an order of battle and revealing the attackers main thrusts.
A turnaround in geopolitics

Ex-Polish MiG-29s will now, not be going to Ukraine. (Polish MoD)
The conflict has also seen geopolitical realities upended overnight, from the assumption that countries with McDonalds do not go to war, to the Nord Stream 2 pipeline being axed. Germany, in particular, has shifted its stance from its previous pacificist approach to international relations, by announcing it would boost it defence spending to 4% to meet and even exceed NATO commitments. Berlin's decision to acquire F-35 to replace Tornados are also set to be fast-tracked This is a seismic shift and one where, only a week previously, the German defence industry was on the path to being essentially being ostracised from investment markets due to its negative image.
Meanwhile, the European Union surprised the world by announcing that it will supply fighter jets to Ukraine via its Member states. This was understood to be either MiG-29s from Poland and Slovakia as these could be deployed and flown into action by Ukrainian pilots in the quickest time - with the Ukrainian Parliament announcing that it would receive 70 ex-Soviet combat aircraft.
However, in an example of how fast-moving the situation is, on 1 March it was reported that this promise had been walked back, with both Poland and Slovakia now saying they would not supply MiGs to Ukraine. It is unknown at this time whether this is because the phase of conflict is now too late for them to make a difference, EU/NATO countries are worried that this would constitute an escalation in Moscow's eyes, or whether the upgraded Western MiG's (with, for example, secure NATO radios and IFF) could not be flown by Ukrainian pilots without more training and support than can be undertaken in such short time.
Meanwhile, Western countries, including non-NATO nations like Sweden and Finland are also supplying military aid to Ukraine, including anti-tank launchers and Stinger MANPADS from Germany, Denmark, Poland and The Netherlands.
Losses so far

Shot-down Russian Ka-52 after the Hostomel airfield assault. National markings have been removed with a tactical 'V' marking.
As pixel goes to page, on 2 March, the Ukrainian MoD has claimed it has shot down 29 Russian aircraft, 29 helicopters, 3 drones and approximately 20 cruise missiles, with 5,710 Russians killed or wounded. Visual confirmation via social media is the loss of two Russian Ka-52 attack helicopters, and a An-26 transport aircraft. A Russian Su-30 fighter was also seen destroyed and on fire at Millerovo airbase inside Russia that had been hit by Ukrainian Tochka-U ballistic missiles. On 28 February a Russian Mi-35 was seen destroyed in Kherson Oblast.
Meanwhile, the Russian MoD says it has shot down 11 Ukrainian aircraft, seven helicopters and destroyed 47 aircraft on the ground, whilst also downing 46 drones. On 1 March the Ukrainian MoD said a high-ranking fighter pilot, Col Oleksandr Oksanchenko (a former display pilot at RIAT) had been shot down and killed flying a Su-27 fighter. Visual confirmation of Ukrainian losses from social media includes An-26 transport, Su25 ground attack aircraft and a Su-27 fighter, as well as a number of MiG-29s seen destroyed on the ground. However the snow on these aircraft in images make it likely that these were non-operational anyway.
It needs to be remembered however, that these claims from both sides cannot be independently verified.
There are also reports, that as well as the ground units experiencing supply and logistics problems, Russia's air arms may also be running out of their limited stock of precision weapons. Certainly the does not seem to have been a repeat of the initial cruise and ballistic missile 'blitz' where over 300 missiles were launched and according to US sources, over 100 missiles were launched in the first hours. On 28 February evidence of unguided air dropped munitions were seen in Kharkov – a terrifying prospect for civilians should Moscow decide to raze cities in order to capture them. Peter Hoare explains: "This suggests that aerial bombardment from Su27s and Su30s is increasing as heavy ground resistance is being experienced. It is worth remembering that this is very close to the border with Russia so it presents not too much of a challenge for Russian air superiority.
Meanwhile, on 1 March the UK MoD reported ''Russia has failed to gain control of the airspace over Ukraine prompting a shift to night operations in an attempt to reduce their losses' a significant shift in its tactics. Without NVGs, targeting pods and PGMs - along with RuAF's lack of training for night operations, this is likely to lead to less effective and more indiscriminate air strikes.
Losing the media war

The 'Ghost of Kyiv' has already become a popular internet meme - despite doubts over the authenticity of the claims.
The conflict is also notable in that by framing this not as a 'war' Moscow has been unable to leverage its slick media and information operations to control the narrative. In Syria, for example, drone and video cameras, regular war room briefings and embedded Zvezda reporters presented an image of a modern, effective fighting force to the outside world. In contrast, Ukraine's determined resistance, charismatic leader and effective messaging has raised morale and also galvanised international support on an unprecedented scale, reversing decades old assumptions about German and EU political distaste for defence spending, Swiss neutrality and the financial 'nuclear option' of blocking SWIFT payments. Memes and infowar such as the 'six-kill' 'Ghost of Kyiv' then, (whatever the reality), have helped internationalise this conflict beyond a local dispute about the Donbass.
Summary

How long can Ukraine hold out for? (RIAT)
It must be borne in mind that is analysis is only an initial one. Events on the ground, and paucity of information mean that it is difficult to assess the situation clearly. However it does seem that the Russian invasion has not gone to plan, and that Moscow's forces are experiencing high losses in personnel and material – with the Ukrainian air force surviving longer than many analysts expected, given the overwhelming firepower that is arrayed against it. What is true is this conflict has changed everything we know about the post-Cold War world.