As Russian air losses mount, former fighter pilot, Squadron Leader (R) FAHAD IBNE MASOOD casts a critical eye over the potential of 21st century jet aces.
Aviation history brims with stories of ace fighter pilots such as the double amputee Douglas Bader or the ‘White Rose of Stalingrad’ Lydia Litvyak. With limited space, many more could be mentioned but one thing is common in all, these were all symbols of hope who made an unforgettable mark when it seemed all was lost.
Present situation
Ukrainian Air Force MiG-29 seen in 2018. (USAF)
Since the onslaught of the Russian military might against Ukraine in the early hours of 24th February 2022, the use of airpower was clear. The numbers between the two adversaries – Russia (300 combat aircraft in theatre) and Ukraine (around 98) - simply did not match and many expected Russian airpower to quick subdue the Ukrainian Air Force.
Yet, by midday, when all seemed lost, the ‘Ghost of Kyiv’ was seen in the skies of Kyiv a MiG-29 Fulcrum fighting on alone. The source of information: OSINT (Open-Source Intelligence), internet social media platforms like Twitter, Facebook and Reddit were alit with rumours that this ‘lone wolf’ was on the prowl.
While losses were neither confirmed by either side, online rumours quickly spread that he/she had racked up six air-to-air kills against the Russian Air Force, downing:
2 Su-35s
2 Su-25s
1 Su-27
1 МіG-29
All within the first 24 to 30 hours of the conflict. If (and this is a big if), this is eventually verified, this makes the ‘Ghost of Kyiv’ the first jet ace of the 21st century. For clarity, an ace is any fighter pilot who shoots down five or more enemy aircraft. In previous wars though, verification was still difficult and overclaiming common, air-to-air kills were ‘granted’ and in time agreed to by historians. Here the 'Ghost' is still looking to gain credibility with wreckage and HUD (Heads-Up Display) view footage – both of which should have appeared by now. This achievement of downing six enemy aircraft is even more incredible in that it was claimed it happened in roughly one day.
Ace in a day
WW2 Luftwaffe ace Eric Hartmann shot down 11 aircraft in one day.
Within the skilled aces there is a special category of fighter pilots who have achieved the feat in a day. Julius Arigi was the first ace in a day with total of 32 credited victories for the Austro-Hungarian Empire in World War I but he certainly was not the last. Meanwhile, Emil 'Bully' Lang, was a Luftwaffe flying ace during World War II and became a rare triple ace in day. He shot down 18 Soviet fighters on 3 November 1943, the most kills on a single day by any pilot in history. Japan's Hiromichi Shinohara was a ‘Double-ace in a day’, as well as the highest-scoring fighter ace of the Imperial Japanese Army Air Service (IJAAF)
Finally, Erich Hartmann, the highest-scoring fighter ace in history and also a double ace in a day, downed 11 aircraft on 24 August 1944, in two consecutive missions. In the process, he became the first 300-kill ace in history and, because of this, gained the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves, Swords and Diamonds, by then Germany's highest military award for standard service members. Perhaps the most skilled famous 'ace in a day' was Germany's Walter Nowotny (258 aerial victories). He scored an ‘ace in a day’ on 17 occasions, including two occurrences of ‘double-ace in a day’ (scored at least ten kills) in the summer of 1943.
Declining number of number of air-to-air kills
Wreckage of a Russian Su-34 strike fighter. Two were lost on 5 March, adding credibility to wider claims of Ukrainian pilots with air-to-air kills. (Ukrainian MoD)
Eagle-eyed readers will note that above examples mostly come from the global conflict that was WW2, where a five year conflict and large numbers of aircraft involved allowed fighter pilots increased opportunities to build up their kills. Since then there has been a decrease in the number of aircraft shot out of the sky by a single pilot from the Korean War (16 on US side, 22 from the Soviet Union) to Vietnam (nine for North Vietnam, six for the US) to the 1991 Gulf War (three for US) the number of ace of aces continued to reduce – with the 1991 Gulf War falling below the five-kill threshold,.
Analysing the reasons why this is the case, following possible conclusions can be made:
1. Decrease in mass raids: Since WW2, there have been fewer aircraft in the skies at any one time. For example, the height of the Battle of Britain composed of 150-200 aircraft plus bomber raids – giving ample opportunities for skilled pilots to build up scores. Today, doctrine and the use of precision weaponry enables smaller number of strike aircraft to do the same job. Today's air forces are thus far smaller than their WW2 or even Cold War equivalents and are getting smaller.
2. Complexity of modern aircraft in turnaround/rearm/refuel: Another facet is the high-tech fighter aircraft of today require a greater time to get ready for the next sortie. While some airforces still practice fast turnarounds, the complexity of modern fighter aircraft with IFF, radars, secure radios, missiles etc means rearming is not just a question of 'kicking the tyres' and scrambling again.
3. No major peer-on-peer state wars: Since the end of Iran-Iraq conflict, no two comparable states have clashed in air-to-air conflict. There has always been an inequality between the two sides. Looking at it with a different lens, there has always been a group of nations vs a singular country. In Iraqi Freedom in 2003, for example, the remains of Iraqi air force either defected to Iran or were buried in the sand, such was the overmatch.
4. Doctrine and tactics: At least in the West (and with the most famous example being Israel in the Six Day War) air forces have concentrated on destroying enemy aircraft on the ground on the first days in the offensive counter air (OCA) mission. This has been successfully applied in 1991, 1999, and 2003 but for the aggressive fighter pilot, means fewer opportunities to engage the enemy in the sky.
5. Speed of Engagement: Present day jet fighter aircraft are far faster than their predecessors and also run low on fuel quicker. Hence, the speed of engagement/disengagement is more rapid, rather than mass dogfights of WW1 and WW2 era, where escorts and interceptors grappled with one another to ensure survivability of bombers which did not have the speed to escape.
6. Rise of drones: With the advent of UAS (uncrewed aerial systems), the use of drones has added another perspective to war in the air. This have reduced the risk to human pilots on dangerous missions but also created a new category of air-to-air kill – the drone ace. Due to the non-manoeuvring and unarmed aspect of UAVs this is still seen as a 'lesser' kill for fighter pilots. But will this change when UCAVs become able to dogfight in the air superiority role?
7. Competition with SAMs: Today's fighter pilot is also in some conflicts in competition for kills with ground-based air defence systems and increasingly lethal surface-to-air missiles (SAM). First seen in large numbers in the Vietnam War, SAMs now represent a major threat to aircraft. Indeed, it may be that a Ukrainian army corporal with a Stinger MANPADS may already be an 'ace' in this latest conflict with five or more aircraft or helicopters to their credit.
Could the ‘Ghost of Kyiv’ be true?
Former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko posted this picture of UkrAF MiG-29 pilot on his Twitter account, alleging the Ghost is real.
1. ‘Target rich’ environment: Considering the numbers of aircraft deployed by Russia in the active theatre, this possibility cannot be negated at the onset till the fog of war clears up when the numbers are calculated and attritions accounted for. However, such a diverse variant of enemy aircraft shot down has been unheard of in the recent, as well as distant, air defence history. Possible employment of a large number of Russian South Western Military District aircraft airborne on day one with Su-30s, Su-25s and MiG-29s alongside attack helicopters Mi-24s or Ka-52s, thus may be plausible. Indeed, as this is written, claimed losses of Russian aircraft and helicopters are in total over 80 – with nine aircraft and helicopters shot down on one day on 5 March.
2. Poor intelligence: A disconnect between Russian commanders (especially SAM units and air force as well as flawed battle damage assessment) may have led to a belief that the Ukrainian Air Force was combat ineffective. (A missile strike on stored and inoperable Ukrainian MiG-29s shows Russian intelligence was not up-to-date). That may have led air force commanders to commit aircraft and helicopters in larger numbers, with pilots briefed on a reduced air threat. In the chaos of battle, the Ghost could have exploited this to create conditions for a 'turkey shoot' or happened to pounce a formation of who were not expecting any defensive CAPs (combat air patrols) in the area.
3. Local/road bases: Use of nearby air bases or makeshift arrangements on major roads/highways could have proved beneficial and possible for such a quick turn-around and rearming of the MiG-29.
4. Ambush tactics: Footage of Ukrainian MiG-29/Su-27s over Kyiv showed them flying very low over the city, leading to observations that that they were using the radar horizon and ground clutter to hide from enemy fighters and Russian long-range S400 SAMS that reach deep into Ukrainian territory. If flying with radar off and relying on the EO/IR sensor of ground control, this could allow for 'ambush' hit and run tactics on unsuspecting Russian aircraft flying above.
4. Clarity of RoEs (rules of engagement): For the outnumbered Ukraine Air Force, identification of the enemy could have been far easier but less so for the Russians. Hence RoEs could have been more relaxed for the ‘Ghost’ for a weapons-free engagement allowing a fighter pilot to loose off missiles without visual/electronic ID in the high confidence that these were enemy aircraft.
5. A fight for survival: With the entire nation under attack, the Ukrainian Air Force would understand that is was matter of survival and nothing else mattered. Previous regulations about flight safety, pilot flying hours, sleep, would have been thrown out of the window in this 'no holds barred fight'.
Reasons for ‘Ghost of Kyiv’ to be false
R-73 ARCHER IR missile on Ukrainian MiG-29. (Ukrainian MoD)
1. Declining Trend of A2A kills: Empirical evidence, mentioned before, directly indicates a reducing number of air-to-air kills by numbers since WW2.
2. PK (probability of kill) ratio: The kill probability of BVR or heatseeking missiles is relatively low, considering the missile technology on a MiG-29 like the short-range R-73 (NATO Designation AA-11 ‘Archer’), Molniya R-60 or BVR semi-active radar homing R-27R (AA-10 Alamo-A) and can be considered at best declared as 'hopeful'.
3. Difficulty of some targets: Even if the six kills were to include helicopters instead of aircraft, paradoxically these are not the easy vulnerable targets they may appear, especially if chopper pilots know a fighter is hunting them. The overshooting velocity difference between the fighter and target (helicopter) is high to say the least, so achieving launch cues for any Fox-1, 2 or 3 missile shot is challenging. Low-flying helicopters are also difficult to pick up and can hide behind trees or buildings.
4. One aircraft or several?: Is the 'Ghost of Kyiv' a single Fulcrum or several fighters? The difficulty of members of the public telling low-flying MIGs apart (which could be flown by different pilots) means that the 'Ghost' could be a composite of several Fulcrums/pilots that got airborne that day. Thus, the probability of it being a ‘morale booster’ is relatively high than any reality in the story.
6. Confirmation shots: In the fog of war, it is challenging to confirm a BVR shot of a fighter jet whereas, in fact an intruder could have been in fact brought down by a SAM with both claiming separate kills. Though modern missiles are much more lethal than previous eras of gun-only air combat, confusion of claims in the heat of battle when actions can be over in seconds has been commonplace since the dawn of air warfare.
7. No Evidence: Related to the above and the strongest argument, is that evidence via photos or videos of debris/wreckage, has not been provided by the Ukrainian authorities. There are also no HUD/guncamera videos or interviews with the 'Ghost' yet, despite this figure being a major hero. This may be due to the Ukrainian Air Force fighting for survival but wreckage of these first day kills have also not appeared on social media.
A meme is born
The 'Ghost' urban legend has already become a popular online meme, with images, videos and those looking to profit with merchandise such as T-Shirts.
Even if the 'Ghost' is proved to be false, multiple (or even one) air-to-air kills are incredible achievements in this era of high-speed jet dogfights against a numerically superior enemy for the reasons given above and this analysis is not to take away from desperate pilots flying these missions.
In today’s world of online misinformation, whether the legend of the ‘Ghost of Kyiv’ was set in motion by either the Ukraine government, internet bots or the public, may never be known. But one thing is for sure, the propaganda worked, for some time to say the least, and gave the common people of Ukraine to cling onto as a ray of hope and symbol of defiance.
The myth was bolstered by a convincing video clip doing the circles on social media (and shared by a Ukrainian MoD twitter account) showing dogfight footage of a MiG-29 shooting down a Flanker with a tail-on heat-seeking missile shot in WVR (within visual range) dogfight. But it was soon deciphered as fake by onlookers who played DCS (digital combat simulator) flight simulator as being two different clips being morphed into one, identified due to peculiar voluminous clouds and after-destruction computer-generated graphic effects of the Su-35.
Summary
The author is a former Mirage pilot in the Pakistan Air Force. (via Fahad Massood)
In my personal opinion and after having decent experience of flying fighter jets, I find it safe to state that with today's law of averages, it would be ‘near’ impossible to attain this feat of six aircraft in 24 hours. If the adversary was a non-manoeuvring docile target unable to defend itself or there was an element of surprise with an air force launching a sneak attack on another nation, I would consider the assertions. But considering the circumstantial evidence of the Russian Air Force bringing the war to Ukraine, both aforementioned scenarios are ruled out.
Hence, I will give it an ‘extreme’ outside chance to shoot more than five aircraft in the limited time mentioned. One never knows that in the future, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence could provide credible evidence but that is yet to be seen.
In short, the Ghost is more a symbol. A symbol of hope. And a spark of hope is imperative in the circumstances of a state where there is despair and destruction all around. The 'Ghost of Kyiv' may be a spectre of fancy, a figment of imagination, fabricated into existence from few incoherent tweets and an Internet meme, but it doesn’t matter to the people of Ukraine who stand defiant against sure devastation. Perhaps, in that sense, the Ghost of Kyiv is as real as it gets — at least for now.